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Gender crimes, such as rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, and forced prostitu-
tion, have always been perpetrated during war, yet the laws of war have been
slow to acknowledge these crimes and to bring their perpetrators to justice. This
article examines the response of the International Criminal Tribunals for the
Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to this lacuna in international law, and ana-
lyzes the mainly positive developments they have made in this area in relation to
the definition of rape and to the prosecution of gender crimes as crimes against
humanity, war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and geno-
cide. It also traces the procedural safeguards instituted to facilitate the prosecu-
tion of gender crimes. The authors consider the way in which these advances
have been taken forward in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, and
the usefulness of other responses, such as the truth commissions in Bosnia and
Yugoslavia, and the gacaca courts in Rwanda.
Richard Goldstone is a Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Chief
Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Estelle Dehon is a masters student at Oxford University and former law clerk at the Constitu-
tional Court of South Africa.
In September 1998, Trial Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal forRwanda (ICTR) rendered judgment in the case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Paul
Akayesu.1   The three judges, drawn from around the world and acting on behalf of
the entire international community, stated unequivocally that “rape is a form of
aggression,” “a violation of personal dignity,”2  and that rape and sexual violence
constitute “one of the worst ways of [harming] the victim, as he or she suffers both
bodily and mental harm.”3  For the first time in the history of humanitarian law, the
Chamber handed down a conviction for rape as a crime against humanity and held
that the rapes condoned and encouraged by Akayesu constituted genocide.4
To date,5  the Rwanda Tribunal has indicted thirty-four men and one woman for
gender crimes,6  including nine former government ministers, and has found three
people guilty of rape as genocide or as a crime against humanity. The Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has convicted seven perpetrators of rape, has held
sexual slavery to be a crime against humanity, and thirty of its public indictments,
including those of Slobodan Milosevic, former president of the Former Republic of
Yogoslavia (FRY); Radovan Karadic, the former leader of Republika Srbska; and
Ratko Mladic, his army chief, incorporate gender crimes.
In the past decade of tumultuous progress in international criminal law, the
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during armed conflict stand out as noteworthy. This is particularly so because of the
history of virtual effacement of these crimes from international instruments and
prosecutions.7  In this article, we examine the successes and shortcomings of the way
in which the International Criminal Tribunals have effected both substantive and
procedural developments in prosecuting gender crimes. We also consider how these
developments have been taken forward in the Rome Statute establishing the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The constant background for this analysis is the recognition
that rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, and other forms of gender
violence will in all likelihood persist among the most heinous aspects of war, and
that the multiplicity of ethnic conflicts plaguing many different parts of the world
threaten to expand the use of gender crimes as a means to bring about genocide and
ethnic cleansing. The institutions responsible for developing international criminal
law in this area are therefore facing a pertinent and difficult challenge in assessing
and augmenting the practical deterrent effect of prosecuting gender crimes and find-
ing ways to change the attitudes that lead to gender violence in war.8
The International Criminal Tribunals:
Breaking the Pattern of Disregard
One of the unique characteristics of the International Criminal Tribunals is the
concern that was shown, right from their inception, to ensure that prosecutions for
gender crimes would occur. This is reflected in the early Security Council
resolutions concerning the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina — resolutions that
paved the way for the establishment of the ICTY. One of these, Resolution 798,
contains the first ever condemnation by the Security Council (SC) of rape in war,
declaring the SC to be “appalled by reports of the massive, organized and systematic
detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”9 As was recognised by the ICTY itself, this reaction against sexual
violence was a key element in motivating the creation of the Tribunal.10
Once the Security Council had formally proposed the idea of a tribunal as a way
to restore peace in the former Yugoslavia,11  the Secretary-General compiled a report
on all aspects of implementing the tribunal, in which he highlighted the “widespread
and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitu-
tion,” occurring in the Balkans.12  Concern to address these crimes led the
Secretary-General to break new ground in international criminal law in his proposed
statute for the ICTY by enumerating rape as a crime against humanity in Article
5(g), and by suggesting that, given the fact that the Tribunal would have to deal
with “victims of rape and sexual assault, due consideration should be given in the
appointment of staff to the employment of qualified women” in the Office of the
Prosecutor. These suggestions were accepted,13  and subsequently the Statutes of both
the International Criminal Tribunals set important precedents in enumerating rape as
a crime against humanity and entrenching various procedural safeguards for the
protection of victims of and witnesses to sexual assaults. The Statute of the Rwanda
Tribunal, set up three years later in response to the genocide in Rwanda, goes even
further than its counterpart. It enumerates rape as a war crime, and also expressly
refers to “rape, enforced prostitution and indecent assault” as violations of Common
Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.14
This stands in stark contrast to the Tribunals’ legal predecessors, the International
Military Tribunal in Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East in Tokyo (IMTFE), which were set up in the aftermath of World War
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II.  Neither of the statutes of these tribunals contained any reference to rape.
Although both the French and Soviet prosecutors before the IMT introduced evi-
dence of rape in the course of establishing war crimes and crimes against
humanity,15  the Nuremberg judgment does not once mention rape. Specific charges
of rape were heard before the IMTFE, but none of the women who had been raped
were actually called to testify.16  The IMTFE did recognise that “[a]pproximately
20,000 cases of rape occurred within the city [of Nanking] during the first month of
the occupation,”17 but it devotes only one paragraph of its judgment to the gender
crimes infamously memorialized as the “Rape of Nanking.” Rape was subsumed
under general charges of command responsibility for the atrocities committed in
Nanking, and the conviction of General Iwane Matsui for war crimes and crimes
against humanity was based in part on evidence of rape committed by his troops.
The equally notorious forcing of thousands of “comfort women” into prostitution in
Japanese military brothels was, however, ignored by the IMTFE.18
For the greater part of the twentieth century, therefore, the law of war largely
overlooked women and gender crimes as potential subjects.19  This is not really
surprising, given that these laws were written by men drawing heavily on the male
chivalric tradition20  and were interpreted by male military lawyers, judges, and
governmental experts in an age when rape was placed on the same footing as plun-
der, and was considered to be an inevitable consequence of war.
The International Criminal Tribunals therefore represent a distinct shift in
approach, which has been characterized as “a specific intent to prosecute the perpe-
trators of sexual assaults.”21  In fulfilling this specific intent, the Tribunals have ad-
vanced the substance of humanitarian law through defining rape, sexual violence,
and sexual slavery and broadening the categories of international crime under which
gender crimes can be prosecuted. They have also advanced procedural law both in
relation to evidentiary rules for prosecuting gender crimes and affording protective
measures to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of victims of and wit-
nesses to those crimes.
Much of the credit for these advances must go to the human rights organizations
that alerted the first Chief Prosecutor (one of the authors of this article) to the anger
and frustration of the victims of gender crimes and to the concern of many thou-
sands of women across the globe that perpetrators of gender crimes should be pros-
ecuted. In consequence of that concern, and of the thousands of letters and petitions
that flooded the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in its early days, Patricia Viseur
Sellers was appointed by the Chief Prosecutor as the OTP’s Legal Advisor for Gen-
der-Related Crimes. She was charged with developing the law through formulating
the approach of the OTP to the investigation and indictment of gender crimes. She
also devised the approach of the OTP to gender issues within the office itself. Ms.
Sellers applied herself diligently to her difficult tasks and many of the developments
referred to below are the result of her initiatives.
The early prosecution of gender crimes was, however, hampered by the condi-
tions under which the initial indictments were issued by the ICTY. Immense pressure
was brought to bear on the Tribunal to issue its first indictment in order to obtain
crucial funding from the General Assembly of the United Nations. The decision was
made to indict Dragan Nikolic, the Commander of the Susica detention camp in
Vlasenica, but the time pressure from the General Assembly resulted in the OTP
deciding that there was insufficient evidence to justify charging him with gender
crimes. As witnesses began to testify before the ICTY, however, evidence began to
emerge that many of the women detained in the camp were subjected to sexual
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assaults, including rape. This spurred Judge Odio-Benito, one of two women judges
on the Tribunal at that time, publicly to exhort the OTP to include gender crimes in
the indictment.22  She took the other two members of her trial chamber with her, and
they began to call, in their judgments and during proceedings, for indictments to be
amended to include gender crimes. In the proceedings for re-confirmation of the
Nikolic indictment, the judges commented:
From multiple testimony and the witness statements submitted by the Prosecutor to this
Trial Chamber, it appears that women (and girls) were subjected to rape and other forms
of sexual assault during their detention at Sušica camp. Dragan Nikolic and other per-
sons connected with the camp are alleged to have been directly involved in some of
these rapes or sexual assaults. These allegations do not seem to relate solely to isolated
instances. . . . The Trial Chamber feels that the prosecutor may be well-advised to re-
view these statements carefully with a view to ascertaining whether to charge Dragan
Nikolic with rape and other forms of sexual assault, either as a crime against humanity
or as grave breaches or war crimes.23
Not only is this statement remarkable in its activist concern for the prosecution of
gender crimes, taking as it does an unheard-of stance for an international judicial
body; it is also remarkable in its suggestion that the judges would be open to consid-
ering the indictment of rape and sexual violence beyond the enumerated ground of a
crime against humanity. The implication that the Tribunal would be prepared to
develop the jurisprudence around war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions to include gender crimes was truly groundbreaking, especially coming
as it did in one of the ICTY’s earliest judicial statements.
The judges of the ICTR were similarly progressive in their furtherance of the
prosecution of gender crimes. The initial indictment issued against Akayesu did not
charge him with gender crimes. When the trial commenced, however, witnesses
made constant reference in their testimony to widespread rape and sexual violence in
the Taba commune, and to Akayesu’s tacit support for the commission of these gen-
der crimes. The only woman judge on the ICTR at that time, Judge Navantham
Pillay, was astute in eliciting evidence of gross sexual violence. Her actions, com-
bined with an amicus curiae brief filed by the Coalition for Women’s Human Rights
in Conflict Situations,24  urging the Tribunal to request an amendment of the indict-
ment to include sexual violence, resulted in a postponement of the trial, during
which the Prosecutor amended the indictment to include charges of sexual violence
against displaced women who sought refuge at the Taba commune.
This judicial diligence in facilitating testimony relating to gender crimes and in
urging the inclusion of such crimes in indictments, together with the hard work of
Patricia Sellers and others in the OTP, has contributed significantly to the progress
that the Tribunals have been able to make in the recognition and prosecution of
gender crimes. Indictments began more regularly to include allegations of gender
crimes, and in 1996 the Prosecutor issued the first indictment focusing exclusively
on sexual assault, without including any other charges.25
It is interesting to note that, on one occasion, the supposed activism of a female
judge was used by defense counsel as a ground of appeal against a judgment of the
ICTY. In the Furundzija appeal26  it was alleged that Judge Florence Mumba, who
presided in the case, gave the appearance of bias because for a period of time she
was a representative of the Zambian government on the United Nations Commission
on the Status of Women (UNCSW).27  The appellant argued that, since UNCSW had
participated in a campaign for the reaffirmation of rape as a war crime, “an appear-
ance was created that Judge Mumba had improperly sat in judgment in a case that
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could advance and in fact did advance a legal and political agenda which she helped
to create whilst a member of the UNCSW.”28
In dismissing this allegation, the Appeals Chamber sketches a much changed
international arena as regards gender crimes — an arena in which there is a “deter-
mination to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to
justice the persons who are responsible for them.”29  The Chamber went so far as to
say that “even if Judge Mumba sought to implement the relevant objectives of the
UNCSW, those goals merely reflected the objectives of the United Nations, and
were contemplated by the Security Council resolutions leading to the establishment
of the Tribunal.”30  Indeed, according to the Appeals Chamber, Judge Mumba’s prior
membership of UNCSW, far from rendering her biased, was actually an asset that
should be considered part of the requisite experience for judges demanded by Article
13(1) of the ICTY Statute.31
Substantive Challenges: Gender Crimes
Beyond Crimes Against Humanity
The OTP, taking its cue from the progressive statements emanating from the bench
of the Tribunals, began to take imaginative substantive steps to prosecute gender
crimes as war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. A most suc-
cessful strategy adopted to achieve such prosecutions has been to use rape and sexual
assault as the actus reus, “guilty deed” in law Latin, of other war crimes or grave
breaches enumerated in the Statues of the Tribunals.32  The first indictment to use
this tactic was the Delalic case,33  in which repeated incidents of forced sexual inter-
course were charged as torture. After a wide-ranging analysis of the constituent
elements of torture, the ICTY made a strongly worded ruling that rape fulfills those
elements, stating that the “Trial Chamber considers the rape of any person to be a
despicable act which strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical
integrity.”34
When the notion of prosecuting rape as the actus reus of other crimes was first
mooted, there was some resistance to the idea from women writers, who were con-
cerned that such an approach would not acknowledge the gravity of sexual offences
in their own right and would fail to recognize the specific nature, effect, and ratio-
nale of gender crimes.35  In fact, the opposite seems to be the case, as shown by the
judgment in Delalic. In investigating rape as torture, the Chamber examined and
elucidated the physical and psychological effects of rape, including the way such
suffering can be exacerbated by social and cultural conditions.36 Furthermore, in
examining the prohibited purposes for which the rapes were committed, the Cham-
ber found that the crimes were perpetrated against the two victims because they were
women, which “represents a form of discrimination.”37 This is the first time that the
violent discrimination against women that manifests itself as gender crimes has been
acknowledged at an international level. It is exactly this type of judicial statement
that is necessary to begin combatting the discriminatory attitudes and practices that
pave the way for rape in war (and in peace).
Through prosecuting gender crimes as torture, the Tribunals have brought a gen-
der aspect to crimes previously disassociated from any gender analysis. The recogni-
tion of rape as a constituent element of war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions is significant for two reasons. First, it reverses the dismissive attitude
toward crimes perpetrated mostly against women that resulted in none of the provi-
sions specific to women in the Geneva Conventions being designated as “grave
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breaches.”38  Rape specifically was not enumerated in the list of grave breaches, pos-
sibly because it was not considered to be a crime of violence of the type deserving
of the greatest liability under the Conventions39  —  the jurisprudence of the Tribu-
nals, combined with a statement issued by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) in 1991, has comprehensively gainsaid such attitudes. Second, those
gender crimes recognized as grave breaches are subject to universal jurisdiction.
This development allows for gender crimes to be prosecuted by domestic courts,
which could facilitate the domestic implementation of the substantive and procedural
advances made by the Tribunals in their analysis and prosecution of gender crimes.
The prosecution of rape as torture also facilitated a key development that had
been advocated by writers and social activists: the recognition of rape and serious
sexual assault as self-standing war crimes. Although this is one of the most impor-
tant advances in international law relating to gender crimes, it happened without any
judicial or prosecutorial trumpet-blowing. The process of recognition began in Trial
Chamber II of the ICTY in Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija.40  Furundzija, the com-
mander of a special military police unit, was charged with violations of the laws or
customs of war (torture and outrages upon personal dignity including rape) for
 interrogating a woman while she was being raped and sexually assaulted by another
officer. The charges of rape as a war crime were based on article 4(2)(e) of
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, which, as discussed above,41
enumerates rape as a war crime under the rubric of “outrages upon personal dignity.”
The Prosecutor submitted that the substantive offences prohibited by article 4 of
Additional Protocol II were “part of customary law and that they enhance[d] the
protection afforded by common article 3.”42
The Tribunal stated without much discussion that rape in time of war is prohib-
ited both “by treaty law”43  and, most significantly, as a matter of customary interna-
tional law, and made the finding that “[i]t is indisputable that rape and other serious
sexual assaults in armed conflict entail the criminal liability of the perpetrators.”44  It
then went on to hold that Furundzija was guilty of “aiding and abetting” the rape of
the victim, and therefore “guilty of a violation of the laws or customs of war (out-
rages upon personal dignity including rape).”45
This finding in and of itself does not establish rape as a self-standing war crime,
since both the discussion of Additional Protocol II and the charge of which
Furundzija was found guilty deal with rape as an aspect of outrages against personal
dignity. The groundbreaking step was made by the Appeals Chamber in the course
of adjudicating the argument of bias leveled against Judge Mumba.46  In determining
whether Judge Mumba’s participation in the UNCSW had influenced the Trial
Chamber’s understanding of rape, the Appeals Chamber stated the following:
With regard to the issue of the reaffirmation by the International Tribunal of rape as a
war crime, the Appeals Chamber finds that the international community has long
recognised rape as a war crime. In the Celebici judgment, one of the accused was con-
victed of torture by means of rape, as a violation of the laws or customs of war. This
recognition by the international community of rape as a war crime is also reflected in the
Rome Statute where it is designated as a war crime [Footnoted reference to Articles
8(2)(b)(xxii) and Article 8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute].47
It is clear from these statements that the Appeals Chamber does not consider the
finding in Furundzija to categorize rape as a subset of outrages against personal
dignity. That rubric does not even appear in the Appeals Chamber’s discussion.
Much more telling, however, is the reference to Articles 8(2)(b)(xxii) and Article
8(2)(e)(vi) of the Rome Statute, where “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution,
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forced pregnancy… enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also
constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions” are listed as self-standing
war crimes. The Appeals Chamber is therefore suggesting that its understanding of
the Trial Chamber’s finding is that rape per se is a war crime.
This understanding has since been confirmed in Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac,
Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic.48  The initial indictment in this case, prepared
on June 26, 1996, charged all of the sixteen counts of rape as crimes against human-
ity. In line with prosecutorial strategy at that stage, when rape was the basis for war
crimes charges, it was subsumed under torture and outrages against personal dignity.
By July 1998, however, the indictment had been amended to charge six counts of
rape as “a violation of the laws or customs of war, punishable under Article 3 of the
statute of the tribunal and recognised by Additional Protocol II Art 4 (rape) of the
Geneva Conventions,” separate from the two remaining charges of outrages against
personal dignity. And by the end of 1999, the amended indictment charged seven
counts of rape as a war crime, reading simply “Rape, a violation of the laws or cus-
toms of war, punishable under Article 3 of the Statute of the Tribunal.”
The judgment handed down by the Tribunal in Kunarac states that the “jurisdic-
tion to prosecute rape as an outrage against personal dignity, in violation of … Ar-
ticle 3 of the Statute, including upon the basis of common Article 3 to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, is also clearly established.”49  Although this could have
been interpreted as resurrecting the notion of charging rape under the rubric of out-
rages against personal dignity, the main discussion of rape as a war crime distin-
guishes between rape and outrages on personal dignity. It concludes:
The Chamber further considers that it is unnecessary to discuss any additional require-
ments for the application of rape charges based on treaty law, since common Article 3
alone is sufficient in principle to form the basis of these charges under Article 3…. In
particular, rape, torture and outrages upon personal dignity, no doubt constituting seri-
ous violations of common Article 3, entail criminal responsibility under customary
international law.50
Although the statements of the Tribunal in Furundzija and Kunarac strongly
suggest that rape is now considered to be a self-standing war crime, what is needed
in coming cases is an unequivocal and authoritative affirmation that gender crimes
form their own standalone category of war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions.
Finally, the ICTR has also explicitly recognized that rape can, when accompanied
by genocidal intent, be prosecuted as genocide, and stated boldly in Akayesu:
With regard, particularly, to … rape and sexual violence, the Chamber wishes to under-
score the fact that in its opinion, they constitute genocide in the same way as any other
act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a particular group, targeted as such.51
This acknowledges to the fullest extent the devastating effects of rape and sexual
violence, and the discriminatory motivation behind such crimes.
Defining Gender Crimes
The other substantive challenge facing the Tribunals in the prosecution of gender
crimes, as pointed out by the ICTR in Akayesu, was that there was “no commonly
accepted definition of [rape] in international law.”52  The Trial Chamber in Akayesu,
in a key step toward filling the gender crimes lacuna in international law, became
the first international judicial body to define the crimes of rape and sexual violence.
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The Chamber adopted a progressive definition, stating that:
the central elements of the crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description
of objects and body parts. . . .The Chamber defines rape as a physical invasion of a
sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.  Sexual
violence which includes rape, is considered to be any act of a sexual nature which is
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive.53
In two ways, this definition represents a victory in the fight against gender crimes
and in ensuring that a gendered approach is taken to the prosecution of these crimes.
First, the definition assuages a concern, articulated by women writers when the Tri-
bunals were established, that the understanding of rape adopted by the Tribunals
should be sufficiently broad “to ensure that the variety of invasive acts which a
woman considers to constitute sexual defilement is accounted for by the category of
rape.”54  Second, the definition is not fixated, as in many domestic jurisdictions, on
the act of penetration, preferring to focus on the notion of “violation.”  The defini-
tion of rape around penetration is a very male approach to what it means to be sexu-
ally violated,55  and it is commendable that the ICTR chose not to define rape and
sexual violence, crimes overwhelmingly committed against women, according to
what men think violates women.
It must be noted, however, that a difficulty may be inherent in these positive
aspects of the definition of rape. The scope and flexibility of the definition could
lead to an overbroad understanding of rape, which may dilute the concept and
diminish the seriousness of the crime. Despite this, however, the definition of rape
and sexual violence in Akayesu was adopted by the ICTY in the Celebici decision,56
which went on to use that definition in its finding that rape could constitute the
crime of torture.57
Two further judgments of the ICTY have addressed the definition of rape, and
have generally entrenched and augmented a progressive definition. In confronting
the broad nature of the Akayesu approach, and in attempting to focus the definition,
however, some shortcomings have emerged.  In the Furundzija case, the Chamber
undertook a wide-ranging review of the definition of rape in various domestic juris-
dictions, and used this as a basis for two changes to the definition in Akayesu.58
First, the Chamber found that forcible oral sex, as a “most humiliating and degrad-
ing attack upon human dignity,” could rightly be included in the definition of rape,
despite divergent domestic approaches to this crime.  Although this understanding of
rape was clearly possible under the definition in Akayesu, the express finding that
forcible oral sex constitutes rape is a welcome advance.
The chamber in Furundzija also restructured the definition of rape, finding that
the “objective elements of rape” are:
“(i) the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or
     any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person.”
This definition is significant in making it explicit that a threat of force against a
person other than the rape victim is sufficient for consent-vitiating coercion.
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Although this recasting of the definition may help to avoid the dangers of vague-
ness posed by the approach taken in Akayesu, the shift to defining rape in terms of
penetration is a step backwards. It is regrettable that the ICTY did not retain the
phrase “invasion of a sexual nature” instead of “sexual penetration,” since, within the
framework of the Furundzija definition, “invasion of a sexual nature” would have
taken on a much more concrete form, while still avoiding fixation on penetration.
The revised definition of rape in Furundzija has not found favour with the
Rwanda Tribunal, which considered the matter in Prosecutor v Alfred Musema.59
Musema was charged with crimes against humanity for raping, and encouraging
others to rape, several Tutsi women. In its judgment, the ICTR reaffirmed the
approach taken in Akayesu that “the essence of rape is not the particular details of
the body parts and objects involved, but rather the aggression that is expressed in a
sexual manner under conditions of coercion.”60  In a tacit acknowledgment of the
difficulties of an overbroad definition, the Chamber then went on to try to amplify
the distinction made in Akayesu between rape and other forms of sexual violence. It
deemed rape to be “a physical invasion of a sexual nature” committed on a person
under circumstances that are coercive, as opposed to sexual violence, which it
described as “any act of a sexual nature” committed under coercive conditions.61
The Chamber noted that the Furundzija judgment acknowledged the trend in
national legislation to broaden the definition of rape, but went on to comment that,
“in light of the dynamic ongoing evolution of the understanding of rape and the
incorporation of this understanding into principles of international law,” a “concep-
tual definition” of rape was preferable to “a mechanical definition.”62  Such a con-
ceptual definition, the Chamber suggested, established “a framework for judicial
consideration of individual incidents of sexual violence and a determination, on a
case by case basis, of whether such incidents constitute rape.”63
The commendable aim of the ICTR in retaining the definition in Akayesu was
therefore to ensure that its understanding of rape is broader than the “non-consensual
intercourse” of many domestic jurisdictions.64  The Tribunal’s steadfast rejection of a
mechanical approach to rape and of an understanding based purely on penetration is
similarly admirable. Nevertheless, the task of drawing a logical distinction between
“a physical invasion of a sexual nature” and “any act of a sexual nature” without
equating invasion with penetration is a most difficult one. Also, a vague “concep-
tual” approach leading to a case-by-case evaluation could, unless carefully under-
taken, keep the international understanding of rape hazy.65
Another benchmark judgment involving gender crimes was handed down by the
ICTY is Prosecutor v Kunarac,66  in which the Tribunal held for the first time in
history that sexual slavery is a crime against humanity.67  The judgment is also
significant in its approach to the definition of rape. Although the Trial Chamber
somewhat surprisingly did not refer at all to the discussion of rape in Musema, it
concluded that the definition of rape in Furundzija was:
in one respect, more narrowly stated than is required by international law. In stating that
the relevant act of sexual penetration will constitute rape only if accompanied by coer-
cion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person, the Furundzija
definition does not refer to other factors which would render an act of sexual penetration
non-consensual or non-voluntary on the part of the victim.68
The Chamber then went on to examine the notion of coercion, force, or threat of
force, and to provide what it sees as a broader version of the definition in
Furundzija.
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The initial analysis undertaken by the Chamber is extremely positive. The Cham-
ber identifies “the true common denominator which unifies the various [domestic]
systems” to be the “wider or more basic principle of penalizing violations of sexual
autonomy.”69  This focus on sexual autonomy foregrounds notions of gender roles
and attitudes, and could present a significant vehicle for the International Tribunals
to begin discussing the underlying gender prejudices that make women especially
vulnerable to rape in war. For, as Tamara Tompkins points out,70  it is not only the
situations of lawlessness brought about by armed conflict that give rise to rape. War
also exaggerates the conditions that give rise to rape in peace:71  the socialized link
between violence, masculinity, and sex; the sexualization of women’s bodies and
notions of male ownership of these bodies that make sense of victorious forces using
female bodies to send messages of victory; the prizing of sexual purity as a woman’s
prime virtue, which renders the taking of that purity both an act of conquering the
entire community by shattering their values and a means of destroying that commu-
nity through the inevitable shunning of rape victims.
These factors are often combined with the view, all too common throughout his-
tory, that women are part of the “spoils” of war to which soldiers are entitled.
Deeply entrenched in this notion is the idea that women are property, “chattel avail-
able to victorious warriors.”72  It would be very significant if the Tribunals began to
address these underlying causes of gender violence, and this is certainly an area in
which the jurisprudence of the Tribunals, if widely disseminated, could be used to
try to change attitudes that give rise to such violence, both during war and in peace.
Despite the generally positive nature of the decision, the way in which the Trial
Chamber in Kunarac chose to interpret sexual autonomy in the context of the defini-
tion of rape could have been problematic.73  The Chamber used the idea as a basis
for redrafting the definition of rape in Furundzija, changing the requirement of
“coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third person” to read
merely “without the consent of the victim.”74  The intention of this recasting, the
Chamber explained, was to introduce into the definition the idea that “serious viola-
tions of sexual autonomy are to be penalized.75  In the Chamber’s analysis, such
violations occur “wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it
or is otherwise not a voluntary participant.”76  So, the judgment concluded that the
ICTY’s understanding of the actus reus of rape included the victim’s lack of volun-
tary consent, and that the mens rea of rape is the intention to effect sexual penetra-
tion, and “the knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”77
This could have been a double-edged sword, for instead of importing broad vic-
tim-focused notions of sexual autonomy into understanding rape, it is also open to
an interpretation which brings into question the subjective view of the perpetrator as
to whether the victim consented to the act. It was very possible, therefore, that the
legal emphasis in assessing whether rape occurred could have been placed on what
the male perpetrator thought rather than on an objective factual conflict situation of
violence and coercion. The Prosecutor may also have had to show that the victim
demonstrated her lack of consent to her attacker through some act or communica-
tion. Indeed, it is no accident that exactly these arguments were made by all three
accused in Kunarac when they appealed against the finding of the Trial Chamber.
They contended that the definition of rape should be interpreted to include the
victim’s “continuous” or “genuine” resistance, which is necessary to provide “notice
to the perpetrator that the sexual intercourse is unwelcome.”78
Had the Appeals Chamber accepted this sort of interpretation of consent, it would
have been a considerable step backwards, since many of the most damaging
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stereotypes about women’s sexuality and credibility have made their way into legal
reasoning through courts trying to determine whether a rape victim sufficiently
demonstrated her lack of consent to her attacker. In fact, in many legal systems, the
requirement of non-consent has led to an unjustified narrowing of the definition of
rape.79  Given this regrettable history, it is difficult to see how the Trial Chamber
could have believed that importing consent into the elements of the crime of rape
would usefully broaden understanding of the concept at an international level. The
prevailing feeling before this ruling is aptly summed up by Christin Coan:
in light of the circumstances surrounding rape cases in the former Yugoslavia, it is
difficult to fathom how consent could ever be a contested issue, as many rape victims
were detained against their will in camps or raped at gun or knifepoint.80
Indeed, Patricia Sellers and Kaoru Okuizumi commented that victims of sexual
assault would be “more likely to appear before the Tribunal”81  because  of “the low
likelihood” that consent would be “deemed relevant, credible, and thus admissible.”
The drafters of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunals also
believed consent to be irrelevant in the kind of situation of pervasive conflict and
violence about which the Tribunals would be adjudicating. The first version of Rule
96, which deals specifically with evidence in cases of sexual assault, provided
simply that consent would not be allowed as a defense to sexual assaults.82  It there-
fore established an irrefutable presumption that in war, “when an entire population is
subject to duress and coercion by attacking forces and when there is widespread
sexual assault, the voluntary consent of one individual victim is immaterial.”83
Only in light of concerns raised about affording defendants fair trial rights by
allowing all defenses to remain open and ensuring that defendants would be judged
on the basis of their individual behavior, was a limited defense of consent included
in the final version of Rule 96. Nevertheless, in recognition of the sometimes perni-
cious effect of a defense of consent on a complainant,84  and with an awareness of
the general context of war and armed conflict, Rule 96 still requires that the defense
be tested in an in camera hearing to determine whether it is “relevant and credible”
before being admitted at trial.
The continued applicability of Rule 96 could provide a useful safeguard against
any potentially damaging effect of the definition of rape adopted in the Trial Cham-
ber in Kunarac, for it still directs that:
consent shall not be allowed…if the victim has been subjected to or threatened with or
has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression, or rea-
sonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, threat-
ened or put in fear.
As the Chamber recognised, an understanding of non-consent in light of this
aspect of the Rule would be satisfied by showing objectively that the violent situa-
tion described in the Rule existed85  — a position which does not depend on the
subjective beliefs of the perpetrator regarding consent. This is important, especially
given that the Chamber makes it clear that the burden of disproving consent is car-
ried by the Prosecutor86  (a clear shift from the previous position, in which the
accused would have had to justify the admissibility of the defense).
Susan Estrich points out that, as it has been interpreted in domestic jurisdictions,
“the consent standard denies female autonomy; indeed, it even denies that women
are capable of making decisions about sex, let alone articulating them.” Yet, she calls
attention to the possibility that “consent, properly understood, has the potential to
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give women greater power in sexual relations and to expand our understanding of
the crime of rape.”87  It is interesting that, in responding to the arguments made by
Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovic about demonstrating a lack of consent, the Prosecutor
chose to emphasise the principle laid down by the Trial Chamber that “serious viola-
tions of sexual autonomy are to be penalized,” but to do so in light of the Trial
Chamber’s comment that “force, threats of force, or coercion” nullify “true con-
sent.”88
The judgment by the Appeals Chamber comprehensively dispatches the worrying
aspects of the Trial Chamber’s handling of the definition of rape. It firmly rejects
any requirement of resistance to demonstrate lack of consent as being without any
“basis in customary international law,” and brands as “wrong on the law and absurd
on the facts” the arguments made by the appellants about the way in which a rape
victim should make obvious her lack of consent.89  Importantly, the Appeals Cham-
ber also expands on the implications of the Trial Chamber’s shift to focusing on the
absence of consent in the definition of rape. The Appeals Chamber explains that this
seeming departure does “not disavow the Tribunal’s earlier jurisprudence,” but
merely seeks to elucidate “the relationship between force and consent.”90  It interprets
the Trial Chamber as pointing to a nuance in the definition — that while force or
threat of force provides clear evidence of lack of consent, force per se is not an
element of rape. The consequence of this nuanced understanding is held to be a
broadening of the definition, which ensures that factors other than force can render
the act of penetration non-consensual.91  In the final analysis, however, the Appeals
Chamber comments that:
it is worth observing that the circumstances giving rise to the instant appeal and that
prevail in most cases charged as either war crimes or crimes against humanity will be
almost universally coercive. That is to say, true consent will not be possible.92
Gender Crimes and Procedural Progress
The determination to bring the perpetrators of rape and sexual assault to justice that
characterizes the Tribunals has particularly manifested itself in the procedural safe-
guards enacted to facilitate prosecution of gender crimes, mainly entrenched in Rule
96 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.93  As seen in the previous discussion of
consent, Rule 96 represents several welcome departures from the domestic practice
of many States.
First, sub-rule (i) lays down that the Tribunals do not require corroboration of
the testimony of a victim of sexual violence for that testimony to be admissible or to
found a conviction for gender crimes. In domestic law, the corroboration require-
ment has been one of the more pernicious and openly sexist legal practices relating
to rape. Although it has been formally repealed in many jurisdictions, it is important
that the Tribunals explicitly distance themselves from the “evidentiary distrust of
female complainants”94  contained in the corroboration requirement. This unambigu-
ous stance will hopefully encourage witnesses and victims of sexual assault to come
forward and also ensure good prosecutorial and judicial practice. Three judgments
of the Tribunals have specifically addressed this issue. The very first decision
handed down by the ICTY, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule”95  commented
that the rejection of the corroboration requirement:
accords to the testimony of a victim of sexual assault the same presumption of reliability
as the testimony of victims of other crimes, something long been denied to victims of
sexual assault by the common law.
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This strong affirmation of international standards of equality between the sexes
was quoted with approval in both Akayesu96  and Delalic.97  Although there does not
seem to have been a case decided by the Tribunals in which an accused has been
convicted on the basis of uncorroborated testimony,98  Rule 96 clearly envisages that
this would be possible, and it is hoped that judicial or prosecutorial concerns about
the sufficiency of evidence, which may result in a de facto corroboration require-
ment, will not prevent such prosecutions in the future.
Second, as discussed above, sub-rules (ii) and (iii) of Rule 96 outline the param-
eters within which consent may be raised as a defense to the charge of rape or sexual
assault. The operation of these sub-rules has become more complicated in light of
the ruling in Kunarac. Whereas before it was supposed that a defense of consent
would be prohibited absolutely when the alleged offense occurred within the range
of violent exclusionary circumstances described in sub-rule (ii),99  this is now unclear
given the new status of consent as an element of the crime of rape. The Tribunals
will hopefully take sub-rule (ii) into account when giving content to the understand-
ing of consent at international level. It is further hoped that in evaluating the con-
duct of the victim in the light of a defence of consent, the Tribunals will require
affirmative speech or action indicating consent on the part of the victim, rather than
be satisfied with an inference from passivity or acquiescence. The Tribunals have
also yet to address the issue of the age at which consent can properly be given — an
important issue given the reported number of very young girls who suffered sexual
assault in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Finally, sub-rule (iv) of Rule 96 specifically excludes another particularly insidi-
ous practice of the common law: the admissibility of the prior sexual conduct of the
victim. This sub-rule clearly dispenses with the implication that “a woman with a
sexual history [is] an unreliable witness.”100  It will also operate to prevent the possi-
bility that women who were assaulted and raped by men they knew might have to
face those prewar relationships being used as a justification for rape. This is clear
from the firm statements made by the ICTY in interpreting sub-rule (iv). In a
motion concerning the Delalic case, the Chamber commented that “sub-rule 96(iv)
is an exclusionary rule which totally forbids the introduction of evidence concerning
prior sexual conduct in sexual assault cases and there can be no waiver of its impera-
tive application.”101  The Tribunals, it seems, are prepared to give the notion of
“prior sexual conduct” a broad interpretation — in the Delalic motion, the Chamber
found that statements made by a witness that she had previously had an abortion
constituted inadmissible evidence of prior sexual conduct, even though her state-
ments were in the public domain because they had been made during testimony in
open court. The Prosecution Motion was brought at the witness’ request,102  and her
wish to have the statements expunged from the public records of the Tribunal was
granted. Hopefully such prosecutorial and judicial respect for the dignity of rape
witnesses will become a hallmark of the new international attitude towards the pros-
ecution of gender crimes.
Such an attitude of respect and care is enshrined in several other Rules, which
function together to protect witnesses testifying before the Tribunals. Under Rule 69
the Prosecutor may ask the Trial Chamber for “protective measures,” including, in
“exceptional circumstances,” the non-disclosure of the identity of the witness, even
from the defendant. Rule 75 lists the measures available: redaction of the record,
suppression of witness identity or whereabouts, assignment of pseudonyms, and
closed sessions. That Rule also allows the Tribunals to safeguard witnesses during
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their testimony, by controlling the “manner of questioning to avoid any harassment
or intimidation.”
The Tribunals have been willing to make use of these protective measures, and to
expound their special necessity in gender crimes cases. 103  The Trial Chamber of the
ICTY commented in one of the early motions in the Tadic case:
It has been noted that rape and sexual assault often have particularly devastating conse-
quences which, in certain instances, may have a permanent detrimental impact on the
victim. . . . It has been noted further that testifying about the event is often difficult,
particularly in public, and can result in rejection by the victim’s family and community...
In addition, traditional court practice and procedures have been known to exacerbate the
victim’s ordeal during trial. Women who have been raped and have sought justice in the
legal system commonly compare this experience to being raped a second time.104
These procedural advances in the prosecution of gender crimes have been aug-
mented by the establishment, in the Registry of each Tribunal, of a Victims and
Witnesses Unit with a special mandate to “recommend protective measures for vic-
tims and witnesses…and provide counselling and support for them, in particular in
cases of rape and sexual assault.”105  Again, a specific concern for victims to and
witnesses of gender crimes was evinced right from the formation of the Tribunals,
with the Secretary-General commenting in his Report pursuant to the Resolution to
establish the ICTY:
In the light of the particular nature of the crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia, it
will be necessary for the International Tribunal to ensure the protection of victims and
witnesses. Necessary protection measures should therefore be provided in the rules of
procedure and evidence for victims and witnesses, especially in cases of rape or sexual
assault. Such measures should include, but should not be limited to the conduct of in
camera proceedings, and the protection of the victim’s identity.106
In line with this, Rule 34 establishing the Victims and Witnesses Unit lays down
that “due consideration shall be given, in the appointment of staff, to the employ-
ment of qualified women.” Although the Victims and Witnesses Units have experi-
enced many difficulties in carrying out their mandate,107  it cannot be doubted that
their growing expertise in protecting the victims and witnesses of gender crimes and
facilitating their appearance before the Tribunals is an important development in the
successful prosecution of such crimes.
Entrenching the New Accountability:
the Permanent International Criminal
Court
The jurisprudence of the Tribunals represents a momentous advance in the interna-
tional attitude toward prosecuting gender crimes committed in times of conflict. The
conceptual developments in this area provide the legal tools to ensure accountability
at all levels of the chain of command, and for all aspects of these crimes. The way is
now open for international judicial bodies and domestic courts to prosecute gender
crimes as war crimes, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, and in so doing to analyze and comment on the attitudes
and practices that motivate the violent invasion of sexual autonomy. Victims and
witnesses are protected by a gamut of procedural safeguards, which may provide a
basis for domestic legal reform of rape and sexual assault laws.
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The jurisprudence of the Tribunals is also noteworthy in that it has not shied
away from telling the stories of the victims and witnesses in detail.  The Nuremberg
and Tokyo Tribunals refused to examine the specifics of gender crimes, either in
oral proceedings or in their written judgments, despite not flinching from gory
description of other crimes being tried.  One of the fears expressed by writers and
activists in the early days of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals was that they
might follow that precedent of effacement, and be dominated by men too “chival-
rous” to record the details of sexual violence, leading to yet more international juris-
prudence devoid of the experiences of the women survivors.  The Tribunals have, to
their credit, recounted in often painful and disturbing detail the testimony of victims
of and witnesses to gender crimes, and have not shrunk away from robust comment
on these crimes as heinous and barbaric.
The substantive and procedural advances made by the Tribunals have been taken
forward in an encouraging and important way through their codification in the
founding statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which formally came
into being on July 1, 2002. This is significant, since the ICC Statute is the normative
benchmark of international criminal law, and it gives gender crimes the recognition
they were denied for so many years. Much of the credit for the extent to which these
advances were taken up by the ICC statute must go to women’s organizations and
lobby groups, specifically the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice.108  The Caucus
worked tirelessly at the preparatory meetings and at the Rome Diplomatic Confer-
ence, at which the statute was finalized and accepted, sometimes facing strong and
organized opposition to giving the ICC extensive powers to prosecute gender
crimes.109  It is a tribute to the dedication of women’s groups that the ICC statute
enshrines all the procedural and substantive advances made by the Tribunals (indeed,
in places even going further than the Tribunals had at that time).
The definitions of the crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC all
include a proper account of gender crimes. In line with work begun by the Women’s
Caucus at the December 1997 PrepCom session,110  gender crimes are no longer
subsumed under the rubric of “outrages on personal dignity.” Rape, sexual slavery,
forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other forms of sexual violence are
enumerated separately as crimes against humanity (article 7) and, building on the
advances of the Tribunals, as war crimes both in international armed conflicts [Ar-
ticle 8(2)(b)(xxii)] and non-international armed conflicts [Article 8(2)(c)(vi)]. The
inclusion of sexual slavery was especially important, for it vindicated the struggle of
the comfort women and others to have their condition recognized as slavery and not
only enforced prostitution.111  Equally significantly, and despite some quite concerted
opposition, these articles recognize that gender-based violence may involve repro-
ductive as well as sexual violence. Of particular note is that the Statute is the first
international treaty to acknowledge the crime of forced pregnancy.
The advances made in the Delalic judgment112  regarding gender discrimination
and persecution being a prohibited goal under the regime of crimes against humanity
have also been taken forward in the Rome Statute, which enumerates persecution
based on gender as a separate crime against humanity [Article 7(1)(h)]. It should be
noted, however, that there was some uncertainty and considerable frustration around
the way in which the term “gender” was defined in the Statute. Article 7(3) defines
gender to be “two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term
‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.” Some
commentators have criticized this definition as an unwarranted qualification of the
term gender, which “will complicate the prosecution of gender-based crimes” and
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which is “unworkable and impractical.”113
Despite these fears, it is not clear that the ICC need be hindered by Article 7(3).
The definition was drawn partly from the Report of the Secretary-General to the
Beijing Platform for Action,114  which was circulated among those delegates of the
Rome Conference negotiating the gender definition. Taken at its best, it represents
an overt recognition that “gender roles are contingent on the social and economic
context and can vary according to the context and time.”115  It is hoped that the ICC
will be free to pursue the understanding of gender outlined in the Secretary-
General’s Report, which reads in part:
Gender analysis is done in order to examine similarities and differences in roles and
responsibilities between women and men without direct reference to biology, but rather
to the behaviour patterns expected from women and men and their cultural reinforce-
ment. These roles are usually specific to a given area and time.116
This discussion would provide an excellent basis for the Court to examine and
critique the sociological and cultural practices that make women so vulnerable to
gender crimes in conflict situations.
On the procedural side, the Statute requires that “fair representation of female
and male judges” be taken into account in the selection process [Article
36(8)(a)(iii)], as well as fair representation of females and males in the selection of
staff in the Office of the Prosecutor and in all other organs of the Court. The Pros-
ecutor is required to appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues includ-
ing sexual and gender violence [Article 42(9)]. He or she can refer cases to the ICC
proprio motu,acting on NGO information. This is especially important for victims of
gender crimes since it allows for women’s NGOs to provide the Prosecutor with
information that might not be forthcoming if left to the women victims of gender
crimes because of the shame attached to these crimes.117
    Article 54(1)(b) imposes a general duty on the Prosecutor to:
           [t]ake appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes
           within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and personal
           circumstances of victims and witnesses, including…gender…and take into account the
           nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual violence, gender violence.
    Clearly the “specific intent” to prosecute gender crimes will also inform the
workings of the ICC.
This will be supplemented by the Rules and Procedures of Evidence of the ICC,
which, now in finalized draft form,118  also codify the procedural advances in rela-
tion to gender crimes pioneered by the Tribunals. Rule 63 lays down that the ICC
“shall not impose a legal requirement that corroboration is required in order to
prove any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, in particular, crimes of sexual
violence.” Rules 70 and 71 contain the provisions relating to consent and the admis-
sibility of prior sexual conduct in cases of sexual violence. They mirror the Rules of
the Tribunals in providing for a complete prohibition on the admissibility of “prior
or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness.” The provisions relating to
consent are, in fact, more comprehensive than their predecessors, specifying that
consent “cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where
force, threat of force, coercion or taking advantage of a coercive environment un-
dermined the victim’s ability to give voluntary and genuine consent”; nor can it be
inferred “by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the victim is inca-
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pable of giving genuine consent” or “by reason of the silence of, or lack of resis-
tance by, a victim to the alleged sexual violence.” This goes a long way to ensuring
that, even if non-consent is considered a substantive element of rape and other gen-
der crimes, the destructive interpretations given consent that bedeviled much domes-
tic jurisprudence will not make their way into the international arena.
Rules 87 and 88 of the ICC Draft Rules codify the gamut of protective measures
available for victims and witnesses. Notably, Rule 88(5) dealing the “special protec-
tive measures” states:
a Chamber shall be vigilant in controlling the manner of questioning a witness or victim
so as to avoid any harassment or intimidation, paying particular attention to attacks on
victims of crimes of sexual violence.
Finally, Rules 16-19 establish the ICC’s Victims and Witnesses Unit. One of the
responsibilities of the Registrar, under whom the Unit falls, is enumerated in Rule
16(1)(d) to be “taking gender-sensitive measures to facilitate the participation of
victims of sexual violence at all stages of the proceedings.” Exactly the same duty is
enumerated for the Unit itself under Rule 17(2)(b)(iii), and the powers of the Unit
have been expanded from those of the Units in the International Tribunals to include
“recommending to the organs of the Court the adoption of protection measures”
[Article 17(2)(a)(ii)].119
Beyond the Courtroom: Changing Attitudes
Given these substantive and procedural advances in addressing gender crimes, the
question becomes how to ensure that these advances will actually affect the attitudes
that lead to rape, or indeed whether they will provide some sort of deterrence to the
future commission of gender crimes.  The first possibility, already discussed, is that
the delineation rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and
other forms of sexual violence as crimes against humanity and war crimes in the
ICC Statute and the jurisprudence of the Tribunals will form the basis for the pros-
ecution of international gender crimes in domestic courts.  If the countries in which
the crimes took place, as well as the state to which perpetrators have fled, invoke
universal jurisdiction to try those who committed gender crimes, the way will
 certainly be open for the substantive findings and the procedural advances of the
Tribunals to influence domestic legal systems. It would also go a long way toward
changing sexist attitudes for courts in such cases, which will no doubt generate much
media attention, to comment on the social and cultural prejudices and stereotypes
that underpin gender crimes.
One of the bars to the influence of the tribunals for positive reform of legal sys-
tems and social attitudes in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is that the communi-
ties on behalf of whom the Tribunals act often feel alienated from them. The dis-
tance between the Balkans and the Hague, between Kigali and Arusha, has led to the
very people for whom justice is being sought feeling as though they do not own the
process, and that they are not affected by the results. The Tribunals face a special
challenge in ensuring that their judgments are reported to and understood by the
people of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, most especially the victims of and
witnesses to gender crimes.
Another possible means to effect change in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda is
through truth commissions.  For several years, leaders of civil society in Bosnia
have been calling for a truth commission to augment the work of the ICTY.120  An
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influential group of leaders from all sectors of Bosnian society, led by Dr Jakob
Finci, have formulated the Citizen’s Association on Truth and Reconciliation, which
is working both to popularize the idea of the truth commission with the general
population, and to establish the legal framework for the commission.121
The Association has drawn up a draft statute establishing the commission, which
has been presented to the Minister for Human Rights and Refugees, who will present
it to the Parliament for adoption. The Commission will consist of seven commis-
sioners chosen by the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It will operate at a
state level, and its main function will be to collect information from victims through
public hearings.122
Given that they are not seeking the power to grant amnesties, but wish rather to
have a credible platform from which Serbian, Croatian, and Bosnian victims can
make their voices heard, support for the idea is gathering momentum within the
ICTY itself. Indeed, the process for setting up such a commission has resulted in
increased interaction between the Tribunal and civil society in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. At the end of 2000, the steering committee of an association of
citizens from Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed the President and the Prosecutor of
the ICTY about the compatibility of the mandate of a truth and reconciliation com-
mission with that of the Tribunal.123  And on May 12, 2001, a conference entitled
“An idea whose time has come: a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina” was organized in Sarajevo to allow all concerned parties to “air
their views on the appropriateness of the commission, its legitimacy and its compat-
ibility with the International Tribunal.”124  Claude Jorda, president of the Tribunal,
gave a speech at the Conference in which he proposed the establishment of a system
of reconciliation complementary to the work of the Tribunal that would allow for a
more effective contribution to the reconstruction of national unity.125
It will be most important for such a truth commission to address gender crimes,
although the mechanism by which it will undertake to do this will probably be diffi-
cult to set up. It is quite foreseeable that victims unwilling to testify in in camera
proceedings far away from their communities will balk at the idea of appearing
before a commission the very point of which is to be as public about their experi-
ences as possible.  Nevertheless, a truth commission for Bosnia and Herzegovina
will have to find ways, possibly through working with women’s NGOs, to facilitate
the testimony of victims of gender crimes, allowing them the vindication of an
opportunity to tell their stories to the world, and providing a vital chance for their
society to begin to address the gender discrimination that led to such widespread
rape and sexual violence.
Such concerns will also have to be addressed in Rwanda by the “gacaca jurisdic-
tions” initiative, aimed at clearing the huge backlog of prisoners accused of commit-
ting crimes during the genocide.  The gacaca system is based on a form of tradi-
tional non-penal Rwandan justice in which communities elect judges to preside over
community gatherings. The modern gacaca jurisdictions will have a penal function,
and will operate by means of meetings at which witnesses and victims will denounce
alleged perpetrators of crimes.126   The community, led by the judges, will then
decide the guilt of those accused.  The gacaca system is expected to be composed of
about 10,000 courts, with an estimated 400,000 court officials. An “organic law”
setting out the operation of gacaca courts was passed by the Rwandan parliament and
approved by Rwanda’s Constitutional Court in 2001.127
The gacaca jurisdictions will play an important role in prosecuting the gender
crimes so prevalent during the Rwanda genocide, as all allegations relating to the
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genocide have to go through the initial stages of gacaca hearings in order to be
categorized and processed. Allegations of rape and sexual assault, which have been
classified as “category one” crimes, will then be passed on to the Rwandan court
system. This means that, although not responsible for prosecuting gender crimes, the
gacaca jurisdiction will nevertheless be forced to address the great difficulties
around victims of gender crimes having to participate in this kind of public process
in order for the perpetrators of crimes against them to be brought to justice. Mary
Balikungeri, director of a Kigali clinic that supports rape victims and widows, com-
mented:
Our hope is that gacaca will bring people to dialogue….The truth is important. Some-
how, justice will have to take its course. Without it, survivors cannot come to terms with
what has happened.128
There have been several encouraging signs in relation to the gacaca’s ability to
address gender crimes. Although the traditional form of gacaca was dominated by
men, the modern version is very different. A woman, Aloisea Inyumba, has been
made Co-ordinator of the gacaca jurisdictions, and both she and Angelina Muganza,
the Rwandan Minister for Gender, stated several times that women will be an impor-
tant part of the process.129  Between June and December 2002, 118 pilot gacaca juris-
dictions were set up, all of which are still completing the pre-trial categorization
process. In some areas, two-thirds of the judges elected are women, and women
have played a significant role in identifying possible accused, sometimes even serv-
ing as surrogates for the absent male members of their families.130  Most signifi-
cantly, in many jurisdictions women have given spontaneous testimony about rape,
131  belying conventional notions about the reluctance of Rwandan women to speak
about gender crimes. Hopefully gacaca will provide a medium through which the
gender crimes committed in Rwanda will be addressed, and which will begin to
break down the prejudices that gave rise to such widespread rape.
Conclusion
On Saturday, May 15, 1999, Kofi Anan jointly with Dutch Prime Minister Wim
Kok, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasani of Bangladesh, and Queen Noor of Jordan pre-
sented to the world the Hague Agenda for Peace and Justice for the twenty-first
century.132   The Agenda, which was the core document of the largest civil society
peace conference in history, embraces fifty detailed programes that set a worldwide
direction for conflict prevention, implementation of human rights, peace-keeping,
disarmament, and coping with the root causes of war.
In addressing the “Root Causes of War / Culture of Peace,” numbers five and six
on the Agenda are:
5. Eliminate Racial, Ethnic, Religious, and Gender Intolerance
6. Promote Gender Justice
Under “International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law and Institutions,” the
Agenda calls for the advancement of the global campaign for the establishment of
the International Criminal Court, reinforced support for the International Criminal
Tribunals, and the enforcement of universal jurisdiction for universal crimes.  It
then builds on these items to call for [ending] “violence against women in times of
armed conflict.”
This clarion call, which emerged from three years of intensive consultation
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among hundreds of organizations of civil society across the world, and which is now
entrenched in an official document of the United Nations, has begun to be answered.
The work of the International Tribunals and the promise of the ICC provide a strong
basis for the international community to start addressing rape, forced pregnancy,
sexual slavery, and other gender crimes committed during armed conflict or as part
of genocide.  The misogynistic attitudes behind these acts can be unmasked at an
international level, and the necessary steps towards eliminating these attitudes can be
taken if the findings of international criminal law are brought home to domestic
populations through publicity or domestic prosecutions.  It is our firm hope that the
history of impunity for gender crimes in internal criminal law will be resolutely
replaced by a future of accountability, deterrence, and prevention. z
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